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At the sitting of 11 June 1990 the President of the European Parliament 
announced that he had forwarded the motion for a resolution by Mr. Goria and Mr. 
Guidolin on disarmament, energy and development (83-0846/90) pursuant to Rule 
63 of the Rules of Procedure, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
as committee responsible and to the Committee on Development and Cooperation and 
the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology for their opinions. 
At its meeting of 19 December 1990 the committee decided to draw up a report. 
At its meeting of 7 February 1991 it appointed Mr. Romeos rapporteur. 
At its meetings of 17 September 1991, 30 January 1992, 17 March 1992, 19 May 
1992 and 6 November 1992 the committee considered the draft report. 
~ 
At the last meeting it adopted the resolution unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote: Baron Crespo, chairman; Romeos, rapporteur 
(for Balfe); Avgerinos, Baget Bozzo, Belo (for Cravinho), Bertens, Fernandez 
Albor, Ferrer (for Poettering), Habsburg, Llorca Vilaplana, Magnani Noya, 
Onesta, Piecyk, Planas and Sakellariou. 
The opinion of The Committee on Energy, Research and Technology is attached to 
this report; the Committee on Development and Cooperation decided not to deliver 
an opinion. 
The report was tabled on 19 November 1992. 
The deadline for tabling amendments wi 11 appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A. 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on disarmament, energy and development 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr. Goria and Mr. Guidolin 
on disarmament, energy and development (83-0846/90), 
having regard to the Treaty on European Union, 
having regard to the Paris Charter on a New Europe, the Treaty on the 
Reduction of Conventional Arms in Europa and the text of the final decision 
of Helsinki '92 "The Challenges of Change', 
having regard to the Rome declaration on peace and disarmament 
(8 November 1991), the new directions of the Alliance's strategic policy and 
the Joint Declaration of Brussels on the future of the Atlantic Alliance (10 
March 1992), 
having regard to the communications from the Commission to the Council and 
Parliament on export controls on dual-use goods and technologies and the 
completion of the internal market (SEC(92) 85 final of 31 January 1992) and 
on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (SEC ( 91) 2145 
final), 
having regard to its resolutions of: 
- 13 July 1990 on disarmament, the conversion of arms industry and arms 
exports 1 
- 14 March 1989 on security in Western Europe2 
- 17 May 1991 on security in the Mediterranean3 
- 9 October 1990 on the CSCE4 
12 December 1990, 12 July 1991 and 12 December 1991 on the Gulf crisis and 
arms exports, the European Energy Charter and employment problems due to 
the reduction in military spending and the closure of plants producing 
military material 5 
- 11 March 1992 on the danger of nuclear proliferation due to the flight of 
'nuclear mercenaries' from the former USSR6 
- 17 September 1992 on the Community's role in supervision of arms exports 
and the armaments industry7 , 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
and the opinion of the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology 
(A3-0379/92), 
1 OJ C231 of 17.9.1990, 209. no. p. 
2 OJ C 096 of 17.4.1989, 30. no. p. 
3 OJ c 158 of 17.6.1991, 293. no. p. 
4 OJ c 284 of 12.11.1990, 36. no. p. 
5 OJ C 019 of 28.10.1991, 76, OJ no. p. 
OJ no. c 267 of 14.10.1991, p. 148. 
6 OJ C 094 of 13.4.1992, 222. no. p. 
7 OJ no. 
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A. whereas the process of disarmament in Europe is based on two main 
principles: the need to convert and reorientate the arms industry and the 
need to use all the categories of military material withdrawn from 
circulation as part of this process for purposes and applications which meet 
energy requirements and promote development in the Community and in the rest 
of Europe, 
8. whereas a basic precondition for implementing programmes to convert and 
restructure the arms industry both in the Community and - especially - in 
the states of Central and Eastern Europe and in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States is the introduction of comprehensive controls on the 
trade in - and export of - the arms and arms systems withdrawn from 
circulation, through institutionalized procedures, either at CSCE or 
Community level, 
C. stressing that the military material, installations and expertise thus made 
redundant can be converted and bring enormous non-military benefits -
especially in the field of energy- both in the states of Europe and in the 
developing countries of the South, 
1. Considers that the Treaty of Paris on the reduction of conventional forces 
in Europe, the previous Treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
(TNP) and intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) and the statements by the 
USA and Russia announcing further reductions in their nuclear arsenals, 
along with the START agreement reached in Moscow on 31 July 1991 and the 
Bush-Yeltsin agreement signed in Washington on 16 June 1992, under which the 
size of the American and Russian nuclear arsenals will be cut to around 
3 500 warheads each, have set the scene for a new phase of general 
disarmament; 
2. Considers, however, that the vast accumulation of arms and arms systems of 
all categories poses a constant threat to the entire continent of Europe 
even in times of peace, causes irreparable environmental damage and 
increases tension in regions which are the theatre of - or threatened by -
clashes and confrontations, typical examples being the former Yugoslavia and 
certain republics of the former USSR; 
3. Is, therefore, concerned at the security problems posed by the production 
and stockpiling of weapons and weapon systems- particularly nuclear ones-
the difficulties of imposing centralized controls and the flight of nuclear 
mercenaries from the CIS Republics to third countries; 
4. Considers that the Community must take fresh measures to fill the political, 
economic and development vacuum opening up in the states of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the CIS Republics following the collapse of Socialism to 
see them through a transitional period which poses a variety of threats to 
the entire continent of Europe as a whole; 
5. Notes that the arms industry is concentrating on restructuring and 
reorganizing production so that it can more rapidly meet the new demands 
emerging both nationally and internationally; 
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6. Notes the increasing tendency among Member States - and a 1 so in other 
European states - to reduce their involvement in the arms industry, thereby 
releasing resources for other, non-military purposes; 
7. Stresses the importance of the energy sector in the process of converting 
the arms industry both at the production stage and when arms and arms 
systems are being withdrawn and converted; 
8. Considers that conversion should cover not only arms production but also 
weapons and weapon systems that are withdrawn from circulation, since the 
technology is available both in the West and in Eastern Europe to convert 
these weapons into non-military products; 
9. Calls, therefore, on the governments of the Member States and the Commission 
to consider the economic and technical possibilities of conversion and the 
scope for cooperation with the states of Eastern Europe; 
10. Takes the view that particular importance must be attached to environmental 
protection in the process of conversion and that no environmental damage (in 
the form of industrial waste, etc.) should result from the new industrial 
installations and their products, the recycling of military materials 
withdrawn from circulation and the conversion process itself; 
11. Notes that, as f~r as the Community is concerned, the process of converting 
the arms industry is perhaps the only solution for the regions where such 
plants are situated which face economic stagnation, high unemployment and 
the prospect of becoming an industrial wasteland; 
12. Considers that the measures proposed by the Commission do not sufficiently 
address the adverse consequences for employment and that it should therefore 
plan and implement special programmes in favour of regions which are 
affected or are about to be affected by unemployment, owing to the 
dismantling of arms industry plants; recalls, in this connection, its 
resolution of 9 April 19928 on the guidelines for the preparation of the 
1993 budget, in which it called for the creation of a new Community 
programme for conversion of the armaments industry in order to resolve the 
labour market problems resulting from the process of disarmament; 
13. Calls on the Commission, in this context, to draw up a new regulation by 
1993 which will ensure further funding for the PERIFRA II Programme and 
define the legal basis for the programme and the Commission's new 
initiatives (CONVER Programme, etc.); 
14. Considers that the means are available to convert industrial plants 
producing components of chemical weapons and calls on those Member States 
which have such plants on their territory to collaborate with the Commission 
and examine the possibility of converting them for non-military applications 
(pharmaceutical, agri-chemical uses, organic farming etc.); 
8 OJ no. C 125 of 18.5.1992, p. 246. 
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15. Is convinced that nuclear weapons present the most serious problems in this 
connection; believes that a policy of converting nuclear plants, using the 
installations, expertise and materials for non-military purposes, could be 
a subject for research and dialogue within the Community; 
16. Considers that after the Commission has promoted the Energy Charter and made 
realistic choices over the Community's future as regards energy, the Member 
States must work together in the field of nuclear energy so as to phase out 
the autonomy at present enjoyed by individual States in this area; considers 
that in this process serious consideration must be given to the environment 
and the highest possible technical safety standards must be observed in the 
production process and at plants; 
17. Takes the view that as regards nuclear convertibility the Commission should 
extend its cooperation with the CIS Republics to cover the following areas: 
- vocational and technical retraining of scientific and technical staff; 
- cooperation with research centres and the university institutes; 
- the provision of incentives for research in the field of renewable sources 
of energy; 
18. Stresses in this connection that if nuclear weapons are to be effectively 
reduced there must also be a reduction in the use of fissile materials from 
warheads; as primary products in the production of energy especially in the 
CIS Republics; 
19. Supports fully the proposal by the Foreign Ministers meeting in Political 
Cooperation that an international science and technology centre should be 
set up in Moscow to offer employment to nuclear scientists who have been 
made redundant and to promote research in this sector; 
20. Considers that the European Community should play a more active role in 
financing this centre- the sum of ECU 50 million may be regarded as purely 
symbolic- and act as a driving force behind measures of this kind which 
also concern other States; 
21. Considers that in view of the fact that many Member States attach particular 
importance to dual-use products which they protect and give priority funding 
to as part of their research and technology policies, the Commission should 
examine the possibility of imposing genuine controls on the production and 
movement of these products as well as the scope for using them for non-
military purposes; 
22. Calls on the next Intergovernmental Conference to reexamine the contents of 
Article 223 of the EEC Treaty not only from the point of view of competition 
and the free movement of goods but also in the light of new information 
emerging today on the production and use of these products and particularly 
the new need to cooperate with the former COMECON states; 
23. Calls on the Community and the Member States to ensure that the new 
economic, commercial and technical agreements that have been concluded or 
are about to be concluded with the states of Eastern Europe and the CIS do 
not further undermine the privileged relations the Community enjoys with the 
developing states in the Third World; 
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24. Urges the Member States of the Community and the Commission to channel the 
resources released due to arms reductions towards development activities in 
Third World and ACP countries, especially such activities as promote their 
long-term economic and technical development; 
25. Considers that the Community should consider and regulate the sectoral 
conversion of the arms industry for non-military uses and applications; 
believes that the Commission should consider the possibility of doing so 
before the forthcoming review of the Maastricht Treaty in the light of the 
new information whi eh wi 11 emerge at both geostrategi c and industrial 
levels; 
26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the 
Council, the Foreign Ministers meeting in European Political Cooperation, 
the Governments of the Member States, the relevant CSCE services and the UN 
Secretary-General . 
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B. 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The European Parliament has repeatedly concerned itself over the last few years 
with arms controls, conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear disarmament, 
controlling arms exports and the implications for economic and social progress 
of converting the defence industry to non-military types of production. 
In the discussions arising from resolutions on these matters it was agreed that 
a common policy was needed to control arms and arms exports and that measures 
should be taken to offset the consequences which the current reduction in 
production and reorientation of the defence industry will have not only in the 
Community but also in the states of central and eastern Europe. 
Taking as its starting point the resolution by Mr Goria and Mr Guidolin 
(83-0846/90 of 26.4.1990) this document seeks to outline the problems which 
disarmament and the reduction in military arsenals will create and then make 
certain specific proposals as to how the funds thereby released can be used to 
promote development in the new political, economic and military climate 
obtaining in the world today. This document will focus primarily on the 
reorientation and conversion of the defence industry and energy and development 
applications of redundant military equipment. 
2.THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 
The process of democratization in the states of central and eastern Europe and 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, COMECON and the USSR are transforming 
international relations in Europe and throughout the world and a new framework 
for cooperation has to be established to deal with this situation. 
The Treaty of Paris on reducing conventional forces in Europe previous 
agreements on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) and on 
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and the recent US proposals on reducing 
nuclear weapons in Europe have paved the way for general arms reductions and a 
significant realignment of the defence industry and the economy are expected as 
a result (TABLE 1). 
Moreover, the changes in eastern Europe and the general climate of confidence 
and cooperation which they engender are producing new policies and measures 
aimed at harnessing these newly released industrial and energy resources to 
attain new development objectives. 
These new measures must be taken as part of the intra-state cooperation that has 
now been set up in political, economic and social affairs: this will both reduce 
the danger of military confrontation and seek to determine the new priorities 
for states in pursuing development and progress. It is clear that in Europe in 
particular the process of disarmament involving substantive cuts in production, 
controls on arms exports and arms sales and a restructuring of the defence 
industry has already begun. 
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However, if existing international agreements on reducing military arsenals are 
to be enforced and if the scope of these agreements is to be extended, there may 
be a corresponding reduction in the arms trade and in exports of the weapons and 
weapons systems thus withdrawn from circulation accompanied by verification. 
A reconversion and restructuring of the defence industry is only possible if 
this condition is met. 
The cooperation which the Community has proposed and is implementing with 
central and eastern European countries must be based, inter alia, on economic 
and energy agreements. 
The development deficits faced by these countries and the task of restructuring 
and re-aligning their energy and industrial policies represent a new challenge 
not only for the states concerned but also for the Community. 
Some observers see this as a threat to the security situation emerging in Europe 
today: they contend that any new threats to Europe wi 11 be of an economic, 
political or social nature. 
A new network of relations between states is developing which, although it may 
not immediately get rid of the balance of fear and bring about a reduction in 
rivalry of a purely military nature which has become ingrained because of the 
cold war, will certainly bring about substantial modifications in national and 
super-national plans for the security of Europe. 
At the present phase in the search for a common denominator in foreign policy 
and defence in a Europe which is espousing new forms of international 
cooperation, the main political priority is to exploit all factors- human as 
well as material - and resources - industrial and energy which may contribute 
to reducing the above dangers and contribute to development. 
The questions facing the Community are as follows: 
a) Is it realistic for the Community to adopt a policy of banning exports of 
arms systems- either withdrawn from circulation or currently being produced 
-and controlling the arms trade in Europe and exports to the Third World? 
b) How will the Community respond to demands made by the states of central and 
eastern Europe that joint efforts should be made to construct and extend a 
network of political, economic and social institutions to reduce the danger 
of military confrontation? 
c) As part of the on-going process of economic and industrial reorientation, 
have the means and policies been devised to exploit the resources, both 
material and human, that will allow a more rapid development of eastern 
Europe and the Third World? 
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3. THE SITUATION IN THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
The defence industry first began to encounter serious production, planning and 
structural problems in 1989. Faced with the prospect of a sharp fall in demand 
and new industrial and technological challenges, the defence industry today is 
seeking primarily to restructure and reorganize production to improve its 
ability to promote development and economic recovery especially in the former 
communist states and Third World countries. 
The main difference between the West and the East is that in the latter the 
resources (technological, political and military} used in the production and 
exploitation of military equipment are the same as those engaged in the 
production of non-military products. It is only the markets that are different. 
For instance, the 1988 report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency found 
that military budgets were stagnating at a time when the former USSR was the 
world's leading exporter, followed by the USA and France. 
Another characteristic aspect is the absolute identification of national 
sovereignty and national security with the development of the national defence 
industries. The state has direct links with, and intervenes in, both the public 
(nationalized) and the private defence industries. This phenomenon began 
immediately after the Second World War when states began to intervene directly 
in this sector, developing arms production and exporting policies. 
However, international detente and a tendency towards savings as regards defence 
purchases are still obliging defence industries to adopt a more aggressive 
export policy (as occurred recently during the Gulf War). For this reason it 
is widely acknowledged that the transformation and restructuring of this 
industry will be difficult as long as it continues to generate large profits. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that states are now seeking to reduce their 
involvement in the defence industry: high production costs and demand problems 
have led to the emergence of new policies aimed at making the defence industry 
itself assume a greater share of production costs (self-financing) and 
developing new forms of intra-state cooperation in this area. 
The same applies to the states of central and eastern Europe. They differ from 
the West mainly as regards their new economic orientation and the urgent need 
for development. The new governments in these countries are increasingly keen 
to disarm and transform the traditional defence industry. 
The problem is much more acute in the Commonwealth of Independent States, not 
only because the state identified totally with the defence industry, but also 
because the defence industry was the basis on which production and trade and, 
indeed, Soviet society and the Soviet economy as a whole were built: foreign 
policy, defence policy, military doctrines, the human resources policy, the 
defence economy and military organization were all very closely interconnected 
and formed the basis for the entire political and military edifice. 
The defence industry which began to develop during Stalin's first five year plan 
in the 1920's managed to exceed the requirements of the Red Army by the end of 
the Second World War. After the war it had to face the challenge of nuclear and 
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space technology, cybernetics, computers, etc. It has since grown to the point 
where it dominates the whole Soviet economy. 
Gorbachev's original move to reduce the defence industry and control production 
constitutes the first significant attempt to transform part of the defence 
industry. However, substantial reductions in military spending and the 
unemployment resulting from the decision to reduce the number of soldiers by 500 
000 have provoked a backlash in military circles. 
It is difficult to calculate exactly what position the defence industry occupies 
in the former USSR's national economy. According to Russian sources, it counts 
for about 45 and 60% of the economy, while state budget data indicate that it 
contributes 11% to State revenue. Other sources put the figure at 20% of 
national revenue. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the defence industry is 
in fact a State within a State: there are 600 000 plants producing all kinds 
of military equipment covering 400 000 sq km (2% of former Soviet territory). 
Despite the fact that during 1990 a low military spending dropped significantly 
and although Soviet officials and Gorbachev himself have announced drastic 
reductions, the former Soviet Union remains the world's main exporter of heavy 
arms to the Third World (Table Il) and the second largest exporter of army 
generally throughout the world in 1990 (see Table Ill) after the USA. 
However, while the competitiveness of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
appears gradually to be declining due to domestic difficulties, Community 
countries headed by France, Germany and the United Kingdom are stepping up their 
exports of arms systems to the Third World (90% of French and British arms 
exports go to the Middle East) (see Table IV). Fears that the Third World would 
be used to absorb Community defence industry products when geo-politically 
opportune are thus being realised. 
However, in the long term, the defence industry will only be able to cope with 
the expected fall in demand and crises in this sector if it converts production. 
Recently, the Community's defence industry has begun to develop a 'dual-use' 
approach, however this can only be implemented in the electronics and the 
chemical industries. 
States with defence industries producing dual-use products are essentially the 
United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy. These governments are particularly 
in favour of dual-use products since these can be integrated in national 
research and development programmes which attract substantial state subsidies 
and protection. 
However, the fact that the defence industries are forced to pay a significant 
part of the 'peace dividend' in Europe with all the adverse economic and social 
costs that this implies means that they must switch to the production of non-
military products. 
The process of converting the defence industry both in the Community and in the 
states of central and eastern Europe will have very adverse consequences for 
employment (see Table V). During the years ahead it is expected that many 
thousands of jobs will be lost in the Community's arms industries and also in 
sectors indirectly linked with the defence industry. This will have serious 
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economic and social repercussions in Community regions with high concentrations 
of activities of this kind. 
Statistics for 1989 show that overall Community arms production was worth ECU 48 
bn, the leading producers being the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy. 
These countries alone employ l .3 million workers in this sector. (see Table 
VI). 
In most of the states of central and eastern Europe the defence industries have 
already shed tens of thousands of jobs. This phenomenon will have a devastating 
effect on the CIS where vast numbers of highly skilled workers are employed in 
the defence industry. 
4. POTENTIAL FOR TRANSFORMATION - PROSPECTS 
There is an urgent need for political, economic and military doctrines to be 
thoroughly reviewed in the light of recent events and notably: the disarmament 
agreements concluded so far, the progress of democratization in the former 
socialist countries, changes brought by Perestroika, the new situation emerging 
after the recent coup, the disintegration of the USSR and the creation of the 
CIS and finally popular demand for development and economic and social progress. 
Disarmament must fuel development, part i cul arl y in the countries of Eastern 
Europe, and economic policies must pursue this end. 
One factor will play a very important role in the conversion of defence 
industries both in production and during withdrawal and conversion: namely 
energy. 
Under the terms of the agreements for a reduction of conventional forces in 
Europe a considerable volume of military equipment is being withdrawn from 
circulation, a process due to be completed by 1994. 
REDUCTIONS BY TYPE OF WEAPON NATO FORMER WARSAW PACT 
Tanks 6 600 12 500 
Armoured vehicles 4 500 14 500 
Rocket systems 1 200 11 700 
Warplanes 3 600 
Helicopters l 600 
As the above table shows large numbers of weapons and weapons systems are being 
scrapped, especially in the former Warsaw Pact countries. 
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Both in the West and in the countries of eastern Europe the technical means 
exist to convert conventional weapons into non-military products; indeed various 
studies drawn up by international organizations such as the UN and also a number 
of governments have found that equipment for use in various areas such as 
agriculture, mining and the energy sector can be made from redundant weapons and 
weapons systems. 
Examples 
TANKS and 
ARMOURED VEHICLES 
GUNS 
HELICOPTERS and 
AIRCRAFT 
> 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY 
TRACTORS 
IRRIGATION PIPES 
DIGGING EQUIPMENT, ETC. 
> MINING EQUIPMENT 
(LAND AND SEA} 
> FIRE PREVENTION AND 
FIRE-FIGHTING 
WIND AND HYDRO-ELECTRIC 
POWER PRODUCTION 
It is, of course, essential that weapons withdrawn from circulation are not 
exported to third world countries; (an impressive example of the non-military 
use of weapons withdrawn from circulation is the innovative use by a team of 
Polish experts of Soviet military aircraft engines to extinguish fires at oil-
wells in Kuwait}. 
In this process particular attention must be paid to environmental protection 
and energy savings. The reutilization of material withdrawn from circulation 
and the conversion process and the recycling of basic materials must not harm 
the environment (through industrial waste etc.}, nor lead to an increase in 
energy consumption through energy-intensive procedures. 
As far as energy costs are concerned, account must be taken of the energy 
consumed in production and energy losses during conversion and utilization of 
the products concerned. 
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The Paris Agreement on chemical weapons (January 1989) provides for a total ban 
on the use of such weapons and establishes the need for a new treaty banning the 
production and stockpiling of all kinds of chemical weapons. Agreements on 
chemical weapons adopted so far specifically stipulate that such weapons must 
be completely destroyed. 
Only recently military circles in the former USSR agreed to provide information 
regarding its arsenal of chemical weapons. According to these figures the 
former USSR had stockpiled 50 000 tonnes of toxic substances; Western sources 
on the other hand give a figure of up to 800 000 tonnes. 
According to American estimates, 42 chemical weapons arsenals are controlled by 
the former Soviet Union control. The same sources give the following breakdown 
by country: 
USSR: 9 
former Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia: 9 
Hungary and Poland: 5 
Roumania: 4 
Bulgaria: 1 
However, the same military circles in Moscow maintain that no chemical weapons 
are stored in former Warsaw Pact countries. 
The chemical substances used in chemical weapons have a number of important non-
military applications, notably in biotechnology, the pharmaceuticals industry 
and environmental protection. The basic chemical substances are as follows: 
- toxic gas containing hydrocyanic acid 
- asphyxiating gas, 
- germ gas, 
- 'mustard gas' (many different types) etc. 
Examples of the non-military use of substances used in chemical weapons are as 
follows: 
APPLICATIONS 
PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRY 
AGRI-CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
INDUSTRY RESEARCH 
PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRY 
AGRI-CHEMICAL RESEARCH 
THE PETRO-CHEMICAL 
ELECTRONICS AND 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
INDUSTRY 
CHEMICAL SUBSTANCE 
CHLOROETHANOL 
THIODIGLYCOL 
DIMETHYLAMINE 
PHOSPHOR CLORIDE 
METHYL AND ETHYL 
COMPOUNDS OF PHOSPHOR 
MLITARY USE 
PRODUCTION OF 
THIODIGLYCOL 
MUSTARD GAS 
NERVE GAS 
NERVE GAS 
Approaches to this problem so far and the above examples give rise to the 
following questions: 
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(a) Is it ultimately realistic to expect weapons withdrawn from circulation 
to be given non-military applications and how can this be achieved? It goes 
without saying that weapons thus withdrawn from c i rcul at ion must not be 
supplied to countries that have not signed the Paris Charter. 
(b) How can defence industries be converted so that they promote development 
and how can costs be minimized? As stated above, the defence industry 
consumes vast financial and energy resources but also employs millions of 
workers both in the West and in eastern Europe and it cannot therefore simply 
be dismantled. 
(c) The chemicals plants which produce the basic substances used in chemicals 
weapons can switch to non-military production. The problem is whether these 
states concerned intend fully to restructure this sector. The basic question 
is whether the Community and the EFTA countries will make an attempt genuinely 
to implement the double use approach which so far has merely provided an alibi 
for governments and industries. 
Nuclear weapons obviously pose a more serious problem. As negotiations on the 
monitoring and gradual reduction of nuclear arsenals progress, the main problem 
facing us today is to determine to what extent nuclear weapons can be converted 
for non-military applications. In other words, to what extent can we really see 
nuclear energy as the main source of energy for development? 
In the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty the contracting parties state their 
desire to develop non-military applications of nuclear energy. Will the states 
concerned seek immediately to use the fissile matter and the installations for 
producing energy? The role of existing nuclear power stations, both in the 
Community and in the states of central and eastern Europe and in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States will be decisive in this process. 
As a result of this process it is expected that the Community will become less 
dependent on oil and more dependent on nuclear energy as a source of primary 
energy (see Table VII). 
- How will the Community react to this new challenge? 
- What solution does the Community have and what policies does it intend to 
implement to overcome the present arrangement whereby individual states pursue 
their own autonomous energy polices? 
- What solutions are there to the problems which have accumulated in the past 
due to the reckless use and uncontrolled production of energy? 
As regards the critical matter of nuclear energy it is not enough merely that 
a political decision should be taken on whether or not to increase the use of 
nuclear energy: the safety of installations and the functioning of nuclear 
power stations in the CIS and the other former socialist states as well as 
serious technological shortcomings and deficiencies raise very real problems and 
increase the dangers involved. 
- How do our new partners in the East intend to tackle the overall problem of 
nuclear energy? 
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To what extent should the Community be involved in programmes to convert the 
defence industry - including nuclear weapons - in the Member States and in the 
other states of Europe? 
How will the problem posed by the restrictions laid down in Article 223 of the 
Treaty be tackled? Will attempts be made to abolish Article 233 or will the 
lists of banned products be changed (a new COCOM list)? 
- What new arrangements will be made to establish a legal basis for Community 
initiatives in converting the arms industry. 
Wi 11 the Community support transfronti er cooperation either between Member 
States or between undertakings in this field? 
- How will the social costs of converting the defence industry be met? 
The European Parliament has repeatedly attempted over the past few years to draw 
up policies to tackle and solve all these problems. It is hereby urged to put 
forward proposals and ideas to investigate the crucial subject of disarmament, 
energy and development in this new era of detente and peaceful co-existence and 
cooperation in Europe. 
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TABLE I 
DEPENSES MILITAIRES (EN LIAISON AVEC LE G.D.P.) 
AQX PAYS MEMBRES DE L'OTAN 
PAYS 80-84 1986 1987. 1988 1989 1990 
BELGIQUE 3,2% 3, 1% 3 { 1% 2,9% 2,7% 216% 
DANEMARK 214% 2 t 1 \ 2, 1% 2,2%" 2 1 2% 2,1% 
FRANCE 4 { 1% 3,9% 3,9% 3,8% 317% 3,6% 
ALLEi-1.1\GNE 313% 3,1% 3,1% 2,9% 218% 
GRECE 616% 6,2% 3,9% 614% 5,7% 5,6% 
' ITALXE 2,2% 2,3% 2,3% 2,3% 2,2% 2 I 1% 
,LUXEHBOURG 1,2% 1, 1% 11 2% 1 I 3% 1 , 2% 1,3% 
PAYS BAS 310% 3, 1% 3,1% 3 I 1% 3,0% 218% 
NORVEGE 3, 4% 2,9% 3, 1% 2,9% 2,9% 310% 
·--· 
·--
PORTUGAL 3,4% 3,2% 3, 1% 3,2% 3,2% 3,0% 
ESPAGNE 2,4% 2,2% 2,4% 2, 1% . 2, 0% 2,0% 
TURQUIE 4,8~ 4,7%" 4,3% 4 I 3 ~) 4,7% 4,9% 
ROYAU1-1 UNI 5,3% 4,8% 4,5% 4,2% 41 2% 4,0% 
------------------------------------------------------~---------
OTAN - Total 3,6%' 3 ( 4% 3,4% 3,2% 3,2% 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Revue de l'OTAN 
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ANNEX 
Motion for a resolution (83-0846/90) by Mr Goria and Mr Guidolin, pursuant to 
Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure, on disarmament, energy and development 
The European Parliament, 
A. whereas the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which came into force in 1970 
and has been signed by the majority of nuclear weapons states and non-
nuclear weapon states commits the parties to the further development of 
nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes, in particular in the 
territory of the non-nuclear weapons signatory states, with due 
consideration for the requirements of the developing regions of the world, 
B. whereas the Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) signed on 8 
December 1987 paved the way for substantial reductions in the nuclear 
arsenals of the two superpowers, 
C. whereas, moreover, if the process of nuclear disarmament is to be 
irreversible, it must entail the conversion of the relevant equipment and 
fissile material, 
1. Stresses the need for the process of reducing and dismantling nuclear 
weapons to go hand in hand with the process of converting fissile material 
for nuclear warheads into energy for peaceful purposes; 
2. Stresses the importance of using existing nuclear power plants to effect 
this conversion; 
3. Points to the need for a wider agreement including not only the two 
superpowers but also the industrialized countries with industrially 
advanced and safe technology; 
4. Points out that the developing countries, particularly those in the 
southern hemisphere, should be the main beneficiaries of the economic 
results of the conversion operation; 
5. Calls on the governments of the Member States to give active support, in 
the appropriate bodies and with a view to the future disarmament 
negotiations (such as the START talks), to the important process of 
converting nuclear weapons, in particular fissile material, into energy for 
peaceful purposes. 
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{Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology 
for the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
Draftsman: Mr Virginia BETTINI 
At its meeting of 29 June 1990, the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology 
appointed Mr Bettini draftsman. 
At its meetings of 19-21 February, 13-14 April, 22-23 September and 15-16 
October 1992 it considered the draft opinion. 
At the latter meeting it adopted the conclusions as a whole by 14 votes to 0; 
with 1 abstention. 
The following were present for the vote: DESAMA, chairman; ADAM and VERWAERDE, 
vice-chairmen; BETTINI, draftsman; BARTON, BREYER, CHIABRANDO, GOEDMAKERS, 
GbRLACH, LARIVE, MAYER, POLLACK, PORAZZINI, ROBLES PIQUER and SELIGMAN. 
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A. Introduction 
The United Nations Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and 
Development (New York, 1987) led to international research into relations 
between the use of armaments, the environment and development. The subsequent 
publication of the Final Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development and the Brundtland Report provided opportunities to focus 
specifically on the problem. 
A further step forward was taken at the Moscow Conference on the Environment, 
Development and Disarmament (3-5 December 1990), which showed that disarmament 
could yield a 'peace dividend' for use in development projects and projects to 
design a non-military international security system. 
If the concept of the peace dividend is accepted and recognized, more resources 
will become available for development. Recent experience on the basis of the 
INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Agreement and the reduction of 
conventional weapons deployed in Europe have shown that the process of 
disarmament and conversion is extremely costly1 • Dismantling existing 
arsenals, especially chemical, biological and nuclear, is an expensive process, 
but releases resources for use in other sectors. 
It is clear that it will take a relatively long time to absorb the cost of 
disarmament and conversion of the arms industry. The Moscow conference 
concluded that disarmament and conversion would release the best scientific 
minds, powers of technological innovation, talent and productive capacity in 
engineering, electronics, informatics and other high-technology industries which 
could be used to create new ecological and economically sustainable models of 
development. 
B. Conversion 
Premise 
Technology could become a means of transforming the instruments of death and 
destruction into socially useful commodities. However, the ultimate solution 
must be to halt arms production altogether. 
We must eliminate the very rationale for manufacturing arms and for the theory 
of deterrence, expressed in Thomas Schelling's famous saying: because the enemy 
thought I was about to kill him in self-defence, he was on the point of killing 
me in self-defence, so I had to kill him in self-defence. 
(a) Conversion of conventional weapons 
The Romeos report summarizes the technical options for conversion of weapons, 
but without going into detail on the technology involved. Its arguments will 
not be repeated here, although a more thorough discussion of the issues would 
be possible. 
Samland report on the importance of conversion planning in the Community (PE 
210.229) 
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(b) Conversion of chemical weapons 
The Romeos report also deals with this subject, but provides little indication 
of ways in which the raw materials and compounds used could be processed 
chemically. However, the issue is eminently political. A chemical pesticide 
plant can very easily be used to produce chemical weapons. 
(c) How can the dividing line between biotechnology laboratories and 
bacteriological arms factories be policed? 
Is there any difference between a bacteriological weapon for use against people 
and one for use against the nature of which he is part? Everyone knows that 
bacteriological weapons have been used since the 1960s in many wars, declared 
or undeclared. The nature 'around' man has been targeted in order to target him 
indirectly. The only possible solution is to outlaw this type of weapon 
completely and destroy those which exist. 
It goes without saying that research in this sector should be banned and that 
the UN should be able to guard against, inspect for, verify and denounce any 
violation in this area, using a body of inspectors with suitable powers. 
(d) Conversion of nuclear weapons 
The Committee on Energy, Research and Technology intends to dwell on this 
particular aspect of conversion because of the advanced technologies involved 
in the problem and various uncertainties as regards the solutions to be adopted 
in order to neutralize the destructive potential. 
1. The obvious way of getting rid of atom bombs 
Dismantling missiles is not enough. Nuclear disarmament will only be genuine 
once the warheads have been rendered unserviceable. Two ways of doing this have 
been suggested: one - the obvious method - is by burning the nuclear material 
in power stations, so as to produce energy; the other possibility is to store 
it under the international supervision of the UN pending the development of safe 
technologies for its disposal. 
The USA and the former USSR will be scrapping a further 3000 nuclear warheads 
by 1993. What will happen to the fissile material recovered is therefore a very 
legitimate question; nuclear weapons will not be definitively eliminated simply 
by dismantling them. 
When a nuclear warhead is dismantled, its mechanical and electronic components 
are destroyed, but the nuclear material remains: because uranium and plutonium 
are so toxic (1 kg of plutonium is enough for one billion lethal doses), they 
are dissolved in acid, converted into oxide and preserved in this form. This 
chemical conversion does not constitute genuine disposal. It leaves the 
isotopic components of the two elements intact (U-235 and Pu-239). In a few 
days, or a few weeks at the most, the pure metal can be recovered from the 
oxides and the devices can be reconstructed. 
The FAS (Federation of American Scientists) suggests taking this material away 
from the military and using the uranium and plutonium recovered to produce 
energy in civil reactors where the fuel would be consumed by fission and 
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converted into elements which are admittedly also hazardous, being highly 
radioactive, but which cannot be used for military purposes. 
From both the technical and the economic point of view, there is a substantial 
difference between nuclear fuel for civil and military purposes. For civil use, 
the fissile isotope content needs to be around 2%, whereas for military use it 
needs to be around 90%. Thus oxides of U-235 or Pu-239 must be mixed with 50 
times the quantity of natural uranium oxide. This mixture is used to synthesize 
reactor fuel pellets. 
To continue with the example of the USA, 1600 t of fuel would be obtained from 
the remaining 30 t of material which can be recovered from missiles before 1993 
- enough to fuel fifteen 1000 MWe reactors for a year. Much the same is true 
for the former Soviet Union. 
2. Can fissile material from nuclear weapons be used for peaceful purposes?2 
The implementation of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces ( INF 
Treaty, 1987) holds out prospects for a substantial reduction in nuclear weapons 
and is likely to make available large quantities of fissile material which will 
have to be made secure- in other words its use for military purposes must be 
rendered impossible or at least very difficult. 
2.1 The fissile materials concerned 
The materials concerned are so-called weapons-grade plutonium and uranium, which 
are ideal for the production of nuclear explosive devices, namely: 
Plutonium containing 98% Pu-239 
Enriched uranium containing more than 90% U-235. 
The quantity of fissile material with these characteristics is estimated at 
around 2000 t: the total quantity of plutonium is thought to be in the region 
of 200 t, 95% of which is in the USA and the former Soviet Union, while the 
total quantity of uranium is around 1500 t, of which 90-95% is in the USA and 
the former Soviet Union. 
2.2 The problems 
Loss of control over material of this kind would entail very serious risks, as 
it is far simpler to produce nuclear devices with it than with the same 
materials containing lower levels of Pu-239 and U-235: it should not be 
forgotten that the safeguards agreements between the !AEA and non-nuclear states 
(concluded pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, (NPT, 1970)) apply to all 
types of plutonium except that containing more than 80% Pu-238 and uranium of 
any isotopic composition. 
Stocks may take the form of yellow metal ingots, especially in the case of 
plutonium, which after being stored for a few years following extraction from 
the spent fuel, contains a not inconsiderable quantity of decay products 
2 Observations and proposals by Sergio Finzi, Director of Nuclear Safety 
Research, and Lopez Menchero Ordouez, Head of the Nuclear Installations Safety 
Division at the Commission of the European Communities 
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emitting beta and gamma particles, which makes it difficult to handle and use. 
It is assumed that stocks of plutonium exist which have periodically undergone 
chemical purification to prevent these problems, whether metal ingots or nuclear 
warheads. However, it is also thought that other stocks exist in the form of 
ingots or warheads containing old plutonium, making it even more difficult to 
dismantle weapons and recover the material from them. In the case of highly 
enriched uranium this problem does not arise. 
The guarantee of non-use for the purposes indicated in the 1987 treaty requires 
not only international verification but also physical protection by the state 
which owns the stocks. Thus once stocks of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium 
are available, there will be an urgent need to dispose of them or convert them 
into products which present less of a danger of proliferation. The only way of 
eliminating them completely is by means of explosive fission (underground). On 
the other hand, converting them into products less open to proliferation could 
provide important opportunities for an energy strategy with a high ecological 
profile. 
The two main methods currently available are recycling of military plutonium or 
uranium in existing LWR power stations, which could probably be shown to be 
immediately effective, and recycling in fast reactors. 
2.3 Recycling in existing LWR power stations 
This is an established method of recycling plutonium. Plutonium oxide is mixed 
in a ratio of 4% with depleted uranium oxide. In MOX fuels produced in this 
way, the plutonium used comes from recycling of standard fuels and contains 
around 58% Pu-239. Technically, the use of weapons-grade plutonium presents 
fewer problems, as the difficulties which arise with recycled plutonium, which 
contains significant quantities of Pu-241 and americium, would no longer occur. 
It is also possible to create MOX fuels using only weapons-grade plutonium oxide 
and natural uranium oxide. 
MOX fuels are recycled at existing LWR power stations using 1/3 MOX and 2/3 
standard fuel. Weapons-grade uranium could similarly be used in standard fuels, 
mixed in the form of an oxide with natural uranium oxide. 
After use, the products from the recycling of 'military' MOX fuels or 'military' 
uranium fuels would have properties comparable to those of products from the 
recycling of MOX or standard enriched uranium fuels. 
2.4 Recycling in fast reactors 
Fast reactors (specially designed) could burn quantities of 'military' plutonium 
similar to those burned by an LWR station of the same capacity using MOX fuels. 
Although this method of disposing of 'weapons-grade' plutonium has the side 
effect of producing degraded plutonium, the quantity produced is less than from 
an LWR using MOX fuels. With this type of reactor, in which actinides from the 
recycling of LWR fuels could also be burned, it would thus be possible to reduce 
civil and military plutonium stocks. 
2.5 Safeguards 
Disposal of military fissile materials necessarily entails reducing the amount 
of Pu-239 and U-235 in the materials concerned. To do this economically, they 
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would have to be recycled in power stations under the conditions described 
above. If large recycling programmes had to be carried out, it would have to 
be ensured that during the production of MOX or 'uranium' fuels from military 
fissile materials, absolutely none of the materials to be reduced by recycling 
could be diverted. The fuel rod production stage could thus be carried out 
under a more stringent safeguards system, which would also permit a method of 
conversion. The following stage- using the fuel rods in civil power stations 
-would present less serious safeguards problems than with normal fuels . 
2.6 The costs 
The cost of reusing military fissile materials is the same as that of running 
a conventional nuclear power station. However, it should be borne in mind that 
before reusing 'old' weapons-grade plutonium (which has been stored for more 
than a few years) further chemical separation of plutonium and its natural decay 
products has to be carried out. 
2.7 Arguments for and against3 
The quantity of U-235 and Pu-239 fissile material suitable for the construction 
of nuclear warheads which exists worldwide is estimated at around 2000 t. The 
majority of the stocks are in the USA and the CIS and a small proportion in 
France and the United Kingdom, while other countries have the rest. Pu-239 is 
inflammable and its oxide extremely toxic, so storing it would be very risky. 
However, U-235 could be advantageously mixed with natural uranium and then 
burned in civil reactors. 
Pu-239 can be used either as mixed oxide (MOX) or in fast reactors of the 
Superphenix type, which are extremely dangerous, or it could be stored for 
100 000 years. 
When Pu-239 undergoes fission, it yields fission products which can be vitrified 
and neutrons which, if absorbed by U-238, can regenerate Pu-239. However, if 
the burn-up exceeds 3000 MWd/te, Pu-239 in turn absorbs neutrons and becomes 
Pu-240, which is not fissile and can be used for military purposes. Superphenix 
has burn-up rates of about 100 000 MWd/te, and virtually all the Pu-239 
therefore undergoes fission or is converted into Pu-240 and other products. 
There are therefore some people who insist on long burn-up cycles in order to 
prevent military use of the plutonium; one or two fast breeder reactors would 
be kept in operation for the sole purpose of consuming plutonium stocks and 
waste. This would constitute a change in the role of Superphenix, which was 
originally intended to be a breeder reactor producing plutonium for other 
reactors. However, Superphenix has never yielded any plutonium: all the Pu-239 
has undergone fission in situ, thereby tripling the effective burn-up from the 
normal figure of 30 000 MWd/te to 100 000 MWd/te. 
However, some 30% of the energy generated by a conventional reactor (LWR or PWR) 
is provided by the Pu-239 generated in it. Military reactors, with very short 
3 Observations and proposals by Tullio Regge, Professor of Relativity Theory at 
the University of Turin, member of the EP Committee on Energy, Research and 
Technology 
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burn-ups of around 3000 MWd/te, have radically different operating and safety 
arrangements from civil reactors. 
Fast breeder reactors would be the most suitable type of reactor in which to 
consume waste and actinides such as Pu-240 and Pu-242, Cu-242 and Ne-237, which 
pose even more serious problems; curium is the most hazardous of all. 
3. Transmutation 
The problem of long-term radioactivity due to the presence of alpha-emitting 
elements gives cause for concern. Can it be reduced? 
The problem was posed 4 as early as 1982 when the Castaing Committee called on 
the French Government and the CEA to consider it - albeit without much result: 
the subject was too complex and the economic benefit doubtful. 
As time goes by, mentalities change. The enemy has been identified: it is the 
actinides, elements whose radioactivity declines slowly and takes the form of 
emissions of alpha radiation. Members of this unhappy family include the 
following: 
* Ne-237, which takes a little over two million years to lose half its 
radioactivity; 
* Am-241, with a half-life of 430 years; 
* Am-243, with a half-life of 7400 years; 
* Cu-245, with a half-life of 8500 years. 
As 10 half-life periods have to elapse before nuclear waste becomes harmless, 
this will take 20 million years in the case of Ne~237. What should be done in 
this situation? 
The answer is to add two stages to the reprocessing operation: further 
separation and transmutation. At the further separation stage, the minor 
actinides (neptunium, americium and curium} should be separated from one 
another. The first which should be tackled is neptunium, with its half-life of 
two million years. 
The next should be Am-242, which although its half-life is 'only' 432 years, has 
the disadvantage of gradually becoming transformed into neptuni urn. Work is 
currently being done on the basic chemistry of americium, in the hope of 
discovering a genuinely selective procedure for extracting it. One possible and 
original solution would be to use cryptates (discovered by the winner of the 
Nobel Prize for Chemistry Jean-Marie Lehn}, which should make it possible to 
separate the various radioactive elements selectively. 
The initial results are encouraging, but the technique, which is very expensive, 
is not yet available for use on an industrial scale. If these minor actinides 
could really be separated, ways of transmuting them could be sought, with the 
aim of converting them from products with very long half-lives to shorter-lived 
ones. How could this be done? By exposing them to the nuclear fire of a fast 
reactor or bombarding them with a particle accelerator. 
4 Angerean J.F., Des dechets radioactifs a vie courte, Le Monde, 29 May 1991 
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It is estimated that about twelve reactor cycles are required to eliminate 92% 
of a given quantity of neptunium. Accelerated reprocessing is therefore not an 
option, either now or in the immediate future, in spite of the results obtained 
by the Institute for Transuranium Elements in Karlsruhe in 1989. 
The Japanese are also working in the same field, with the OMEGA project. Ought 
Community funds to be made available for the construction of an incineration 
reactor and a special-purpose accelerator? The Japanese allocated the 
equivalent of 13 million French francs for separation and 42 million French 
francs for transmutation in 1991. 
The Americans, for their part, started up an actinide and lanthanide separation 
and extraction plant at Hanford in 1991 and, at the prompting of Argonne 
National Laboratory, a new incineration reactor system in 1990. 
4. Possible solutions 
4.1 Storage above ground rather than in geological formations, pending more 
specific results from transmutation research. 
4.2 Comparison of possibilities of recycling nuclear material from nuclear 
weapons using MOX, bearing in mind however that there are major problems with 
reprocessing. 
4.3 Placing stocks under international control. 
4.4 Promoting research by the JRC and universities on transmutation so that 
Europe can match the research efforts of the Americans and the Japanese. 
4.5 Resolving the Superphenix syndrome: Superphenix has been shut down since 
1990 because it is too dangerous on account of the presence of plutonium in the 
sea and of thousands of tonnes of liquid sodium which would ignite on contact 
with water and air, and numerous shutdowns since it was commissioned in 19855 • 
It has operated for a total of two years in the 6 1/2 years of its existence, 
at a cost of FF 27.5 billion. Will fast reactors be needed to overcome the 
shortage of nuclear fuel or to solve the problem of nuclear weapons? 
5 May 1987: sodium leak in the carousel 
September 1989: shutdown for adjustments to the core and study of a 
hypothetical argon bubble 
April 1990: sodium leak shortly after restarting 
June 1990: restart 
July 1990: shutdown due to contamination through oxidation of the liquid 
sodium required to cool the reactor 
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